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ISLAMIC LAW IN ACTION: AUTHORITY, DISCRETION, AND EVERYDAY 
EXPERIENCES IN MAMLUK EGYPT.  By Kristen Stilt.  Oxford University Press 
2012.  Pp. 238.  $85.44.  ISBN: 0-199-60243-3. 
Kristen Stilt has written a splendid work in Islamic Law in Action, 
one whose influence is certain to resonate in years to come.  Increasing 
numbers of us in the American law academy are interested in applying 
some of the lessons of American legal realism to the study of Islamic 
law and in understanding, as Stilt would put it, how Islamic law works 
“in action.” (10)  Yet Stilt brings a new perspective, one of a practiced 
historian and a lawyer.  There is some irony in the fact that much, 
though assuredly not all, of the historical work on Islamic law 
undertaken by historians and Islamic studies specialists focuses on 
doctrine, while most of us in the legal academy who address Islamic law 
in our times try to understand its operation in action.  After all, Islamic 
law was far more relevant to governing a social polity in earlier times 
than in modernity.  Thus, a careful and scholarly legal approach to the 
application of Islamic law in earlier eras would be warranted to 
understand the relationship of jurists’ law, the sultan’s command, and 
social, political and economic reality.  This is precisely what Stilt has 
offered, in commendable fashion. 
Stilt’s focus is Mamluk Egypt, and specifically the cities of Cairo 
and Fustat between 1250 and 1517 C.E. (14)  She is interested in the 
actions taken, and not taken, by that appointed agent of the sultan 
responsible for commanding the right and forbidding the wrong in 
public spaces, the muhtasib. (43)  The position of the muhtasib is 
particularly interesting, Stilt points out, because he is responsible for 
enforcing not only Islamic law as laid out by the jurists, commonly 
referred to as fiqh, but also the positive policy-based prescriptions of the 
Mamluk sultan, referred to historically as siyasa. (42)  The muhtasib is 
also more keenly sensitive to public pressures and economic distress 
than a judge would be, given his role as general enforcer of market 
discipline (including monitoring coinage and the accuracy of weights 
and measures) and from Stilt’s reports, the apparent tendency of the 
general populace to throw stones at him or at his door in times of severe 
economic distress. (70, 159)  
Having thus introduced the role of the muhtasib, Stilt then goes on 
in successive chapters to lay out the decisions of particular muhtasibin in 
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specific areas of concern.  These chapters deal, respectively, with 
regulation of acts of devotion (such as prayer), punishment for crime, 
relations with Christians and Jews, the market generally, the purchase 
and sale of bread, currency and taxes, and the maintenance of public 
order.  In each case, Stilt offers an example of muhtasib conduct and 
attempts to explain the causes of and justifications for the action taken 
through references to various influences, including but by no means 
limited to Islamic legal doctrine.  What she highlights most effectively 
through these examples is that the obsession of so much scholarship 
over whether or not Islamic law was actually applied in practice is, as 
she describes it at the outset of her work, unduly narrowing. (1-2)  In 
writing that is fluid, clear and compelling, she persuasively demonstrates 
that the more appropriate question to ask is how it was applied, and what 
countervailing forces might have existed to limit, qualify or even 
marginalize its application in given circumstances.  Her achievement is 
remarkable. 
To take one of the most salient of many scintillating examples 
offered in the work, in 1438, the muhtasib of Cairo was responsible for 
carrying out a sultan’s order to ban women from the public streets 
during a particularly severe bout of plague. (103-04)  Was Islamic law 
involved in this sultan’s decision?  Absolutely, in the sense that the 
sultan appeared to be acting after consulting with the jurists in an effort 
to limit incidences of zina, or fornication, which is strictly prohibited in 
Islamic law. (106)  There is also ample juristic justification for 
“blocking the means” to an act of fornication by limiting the ability of 
the sexes to interact with one another. (102)  However, law alone hardly 
provides a complete basis for the decision made.  Other considerations 
well beyond religious doctrine proved relevant as well, including the 
sultan’s need to demonstrate that he was doing something to deal with 
the plague and the underlying belief that a plague could actually be 
stopped by limiting acts of fornication.  There is also what I might 
describe as an extreme lack of concern on the part of ruling authorities 
with the plight of women, and particularly poor women, who would 
naturally be most devastated by an order effectively preventing them 
from working.  
Somewhat disconcertingly, Stilt charitably describes the 
authorities’ attitude as simply a presumption that “households can 
survive without women shopping or working outside the home.” (106)  
Perhaps it was that, though certainly the reports Stilt offers as to two 
specific women suggest otherwise.  One left the home for a necessity, 
and was seized upon by the muhtasib and his assistants, who proceeded 
BOOK Review_ Islamic Law in Action Final Draft 1/11/2013  5:12 PM 
101] BOOK REVIEW 103 
to severely beat and injure her.  She was only released after others 
intervened on her behalf. (104)  Another woman was prevented from 
attending the funeral of her only son and was thereby induced to commit 
suicide. (104)  These do not appear to be the stories of men who are 
unaware of the consequences of their actions, but rather of men who do 
not much care about those consequences.  
Were this the only case in this book in which the sultan or the 
muhtasib sought to deflect a matter of public concern by targeting 
society’s most vulnerable elements and showing scant concern for their 
welfare, then perhaps the incident could be explained away.  But a 
subsequent plague seems to have resulted in the enforcement of strict 
and humiliating dress rules on Jews and Christians, including a 
requirement that they wear bells around their necks when entering the 
public bathhouses. (116)  Yet another time, public resentment against 
Christians in the employ of the sultan resulted in the sultan stripping his 
own Christian employee naked and parading him through the streets in 
ignominious fashion, then throwing him in jail, all presumably for the 
offense of having accepted the employment offered by his punisher. 
(119)  Stilt’s account vests women and religious minorities with agency 
to defy bans at times, though this passive resistance is at the sufferance 
of the state. (118)  As the example banning women from leaving their 
homes, and another excellent example respecting payment of a tax by 
religious minorities both demonstrate, when the state chose to enforce its 
edicts with rigor against its most vulnerable subjects, resistance was all 
but futile. (124) 
Thus, for all of her laudable and effective focus on law “in action,” 
Stilt might have benefited from the lessons of the critical legal scholars 
of the past half century to more fully explore how law helps to preserve 
particular structural inequalities.  
An especially startling example is offered in one of the reports of a 
crisis over the price of bread, the main staple of the Egyptian masses at 
the time.  After the price of bread grew more than threefold, the sultan 
dispatched the wali, or governor, of Cairo to the markets, who proceeded 
to whip bakers and millers of grain.  Unsurprisingly, this made matters 
worse, and the sultan then responded by setting a price twice the original 
market rate before the crisis began, but well below the going price at the 
time it was set.  The market reaction was to hoard the grain, leading to a 
serious shortage and market disturbances. (150-52) 
As Stilt tells this story, “[t]he sultan was distressed by the people’s 
suffering,” but he was limited in his ability to do anything about it 
because the commanders of the military, the so-called amirs, controlled 
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the grain supply and were responsible for most of the hoarding. (151)  
He dispatched a reliable muhtasib to the merchant capital Fustat, and the 
muhtasib took account of the existing grain supplies and attempted to 
control the supply of grain in a centralized, planned, and orderly fashion.  
Brokers of two of the amirs tried to sell the grain surreptitiously at an 
above-market price.  The muhtasib brought them before a particularly 
influential amir, who had them beaten severely and paraded 
ignominiously through the streets.  At this point, the story appears 
incongruous, in that Stilt indicates both that “[a]fter that, no amir dared 
open his storehouse without the muhtasib’s permission” and, two 
sentences later “some amirs were still hoarding their grain or selling 
outside of the established market.” (151)  In any event, the methods 
were unsuccessful in stopping the hoarding until, finally, shipments of 
grain arrived from Damascus and Upper Egypt. (151)  Stilt follows this 
story with a careful, nuanced, and deeply relevant reflection of Islamic 
legal doctrine on hoarding and price setting and the extent to which it 
played a role in the sultan’s management of the crisis. (152-55) 
One feels some sense of sympathy for the sultan in Stilt’s retelling.  
He feels the suffering of the people, yet he is constrained in taking 
particular actions against the amirs, partly for doctrinal reasons limiting 
state actions against importers of grain, but partly because of their power 
and influence.  Yet, he does take “decisive measures to improve the 
situation.” (156)  “Most importantly, the sultan was able to draw in new 
grain supplies from the provinces,” thereby ending the crisis. (156) 
Yet questions abound in this almost romantic tale of crisis and 
effective sultanic involvement through the navigation of Islamic legal 
doctrine, popular demands, and economic necessities.  Were Mamluk 
executive officials, whether sultan, wali or muhtasib, truly unaware by 
1336 C.E., after over a century’s experience ruling the state, that beating 
bakers and millers would not resolve a bread crisis?  Did the sultan 
really use his “full efforts” to deal with the problem?  Are “full efforts” 
reflected in having abusive commanders beat their own subordinates for 
carrying out commands related to hoarding and selling no doubt given 
by the commanders themselves?  Why would those commanders not act 
as any economically rational actor would and ignore the sultan, given 
the prospect of profit and given that the sole punishment for defiance 
was the imposition of an obligation to beat their own subordinates?  
And most importantly, it might behoove us to look more closely at 
the true source of the abatement of the crisis—the grain from the 
provinces.  Are the peasants of Upper Egypt truly like the inhabitants of 
Shakespeare’s Forest of Arden, delightful in their unwashed simplicity, 
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lacking pretension and overflowing in the bounty of the earth, ready to 
share it with any hungry fellow that happened by?1  In the midst of an 
urban bread crisis?  Or might they be suffering from a food crisis 
themselves?   
Another version of this story would then proceed as follows.  A 
sultan dramatically unconcerned with the people of Cairo and Fustat but 
wanting to retain ruling legitimacy in their eyes was confronted with a 
bread crisis.  He resorted to the usual technique of appearing to do 
something while hoping the crisis would disappear—beating a few 
bakers and millers and setting a price.  Unfortunately the crisis 
remained.  Meanwhile, the sultan’s muhtasib, aware that resentment 
might be growing against the amirs whose support he needed to 
continue in his position, resorted to another technique, in league with the 
amirs.  He detained a few of their brokers, and had the amirs beat them, 
thereby demonstrating the amirs’ support for the sultan’s policy, even as 
they undermined it by continuing to hoard and sell outside the 
established market.  When the crisis still did not abate, the sultan 
decided to anticipate Stalin’s planned famines.  He strategically denied 
the provinces food while forcing the abatement the crisis nearer to home 
in the cities.  In the end, it all worked out—for the amirs, the wali, the 
muhtasib and the sultan, that is.  The result was not quite so sanguine for 
the whipped bakers and millers, the brokers paraded ignominiously 
through the streets, the urban population subjected to a bread crisis and 
the peasantry in famine. 
Of course, when prices reverse themselves, and bread proves 
cheap, a different result might well be expected.  Hence only a year after 
the rise in prices came a dramatic drop, and the amirs immediately took 
action to change this.  Stilt indicates that the powerful amir al-Nashw, 
who led the effort to raise the prices, “did not call for prices of wheat to 
be set at a higher point—he called for a negotiation between the 
muhtasib and the millers with the goal of getting the millers to agree to 
pay more for wheat.” (157)  The latter, it seems, is juristically 
permissible, the former is not, or at least is more problematic.  This is 
interesting, and Stilt ably as always leads us through the folds of 
doctrine on the point. (157-58)  Yet she misses an opportunity by 
removing the focus from structural maldistributions of influence and 
power, which are as obvious as can be imagined in this instance, where a 
market actor is forcing the sultan’s representative to take particular 
actions in his favor as part of a supposedly public duty to command right 
                                                          
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT, act II, sc 7. 
BOOK Review_ Islamic Law in Action Final Draft 1/11/2013  5:12 PM 
106 JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION [Vol. XXVIII 
and forbid wrong.  
Specifically, two possibilities exist as to how religious doctrine 
respecting price setting is being used.  The first is that the millers, the 
first ones beaten in a bread crisis, do not have much bargaining power to 
“negotiate” and the amir is merely using a doctrinal nicety to get the 
captured state actor, the muhtasib, to impose a price.  In this case, 
doctrine is a ruse, employed as a cover in order to excuse what is at its 
core an illegal act.  The other possibility is that the millers are involved 
to some extent in a genuine negotiation, or benefit from it, because it 
permits them to collude and raise their own profits.  This specific 
doctrinal permission thereby permits these commercial actors to engage 
in a massive wealth transfer from those forced to purchase bread for 
basic sustenance to the merchant class millers and, to a much greater 
extent, the powerful amir.  Here the doctrinal rule would not so much be 
cover for illegality, but rather the source of the justification for what 
otherwise appears to be an unconscionable exacerbation of existing 
maldistributions of wealth.  Either is a fascinating example of the 
manner in which legal doctrine was used, or abused, by powerful forces 
to sustain structures of wealth inequality. 
Unfortunately, this question is not pursued.  Stilt does point out 
that al-Nashw was a particularly fearsome amir and to obey his 
command was the wiser move on the part of the millers, though she also 
points out they might have benefited themselves.  Less congenially, she 
indicates the muhtasib might have served the greater social good by 
hammering out this agreement, thereby preventing a crisis that could 
have developed between al-Nashw and the millers. (158)  I suppose this 
is so, as much as it serves the greater social good for the police to assist 
an armed thief in acquiring my wallet, because to challenge the thief will 
certainly result in an armed confrontation between the police and the 
thief.  The position requires a presumption that there is something 
legitimate in the thief’s initial action, or at least that his right to my 
property is equal to, if not greater than, my own.  Remove the 
presumption, and the police are merely acting as agents of theft, a 
corruption of the social good, not its faithful stewards.  
The problem is not that Stilt is unaware of material considerations; 
in fact, she discusses them to explain, at least in part, lax enforcement of 
vice laws despite quite strict doctrinal prohibitions in some cases (99), 
and curious rules respecting the teaching of prayer to those who would 
be presumed to know how to pray. (75-76)  The problem, rather, is that 
she has failed to question seriously whether or not the chief function of 
the muhtasib during the Mamluk era was to preserve structural 
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inequalities and material imbalances of power, and that doctrine was 
used, abused and ignored in various interesting and noteworthy ways to 
achieve this goal, with all else being a distracting sideshow.  Hence, for 
example, the book does not deal at length with commercial matters until 
its final chapters, where this effect is most obvious, despite the fact that 
as Stilt acknowledges, the sultan’s charge to the muhtasib included most 
explicitly reference to commercial and market regulation. (51-53)  
That the muhtasib, particularly in the latter part of Mamluk rule, 
paid for the privilege of occupying the position is even more telling.  
Stilt points it out more than once and discusses its effects in brief (63, 
75-76), but does not fully explore the consequences of such a manner of 
appointment.  It is hard to take seriously the idea of an agent acting for 
the public interest and the greater social good while having to extract 
rents from the relevant communities he polices or suffer physical 
reprimand from the sultan himself for failing to pay back the sums he 
promised to raise, as happened at least once. (75)  Vice taxes, bribery to 
avoid enforcement of rules against, for example, the sale of rotten meat 
and, most of all, capture of the agent by the most powerful market 
players, are practices almost inevitable under such a system. 
I should also note that in the closing pages of the book, Stilt falters 
in attempting to link the lessons from this era to the use of Islamic law in 
modernity.  She points out that “some modern nations” have a muhtasib 
or one fulfilling the same functions. (208)  However, her citation is to a 
page in the substantial work of Frank Vogel, who mentions only one, 
Saudi Arabia, a state that she correctly describes on the next page as 
“exceptional.” (208-09)  Surely she is aware that the last thing that the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Islamist Ennahda Party of Tunisia, or 
the Syrian Islamist elements in opposition want to do is to even hint at 
the creation of a state office that would involve an individual with a 
whip in his hand empowered to patrol the streets in order to command 
the good and forbid the wrong.  This is precisely the caricature that their 
secular opponents wish to impute to them, as a stern moral police whose 
medieval notions stand in stark contrast to those of liberal democracy.2  
By contrast, the Islamist parties attempt to describe themselves as 
moderate and modern, emphasizing anticorruption and economic 
development and in many cases specifically disclaiming any desire to 
                                                          
 2. See, e.g., Shafiq: Under Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt Will Return to Middle Ages, AL 
BAWABA (June 4, 2012), http://www.albawaba.com/news/shafiq-under-muslim-brotherhood-
egypt-will-return-middle-ages-428084 (quoting secular Egyptian presidential candidate Ahmed 
Shafiq respecting allegedly medieval tendencies of Muslim Brotherhood). 
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engage in moral policing.3 
The remainder of her ruminations respecting law and authority in 
the Islamic context, in particular concerning the distinction between fiqh 
and siyasa as applied to modernity, are not, in the absence of a muhtasib, 
directly relevant to her pathbreaking work.  In any event, they seem 
misplaced.  This is most obvious in the fact that the term siyasa, if it 
referred to sultan’s policy-based edicts in the Mamluk era, certainly does 
not mean that now.  Rather, it is the modern Arabic word for “politics” 
and to suggest to a group of modern Arab lawyers that a legislature’s 
enactments, like those of a sultan, should be understood and interpreted 
within the framework of siyasa would be considered abhorrent, as it 
would seem to suggest in modern parlance that the interpretation of law 
is a political exercise, a notion resisted quite strongly in the Arab legal 
community, where formalism reigns.  This is not, let me emphasize, 
merely a question of nomenclature.  It is about a fundamentally modern 
set of assumptions respecting how law is made (by a legislature, through 
the exercise of politics, or siyasa) and then interpreted (by judges, 
through the exercise of legal reasoning quite divorced from siyasa).  The 
transposition of ideas from Mamluk Egypt hardly seems possible, except 
at such a high level of abstraction it would necessarily have to be 
dismissed as more symbolic than real. 
In any event, there is no need for these final few pages.  Stilt’s 
account of Mamluk Egypt stands on its own as a thorough, original and 
scholarly description of the historic interplay of Islamic law, sultan’s 
policy and social forces in the application of law in one setting.  It would 
be a mistake to demand that it tell us something about Islam, or Islamic 
law, in our times.  Perhaps it would be better if it did not.  After all, the 
reports Stilt so vividly brings to light are of Jewish women forced to 
wear yellow buttons (116), of a Christian man whipped and made to 
walk naked in the streets by his employer for daring to accept the 
employment offered to him (119), of women barred from public view 
despite extreme hardship (104), and, most of all, of a supposedly public 
official responsible for “commanding right and forbidding wrong” so in 
need of money to continue in his position that he acts as agent for 
                                                          
 3. See Charles Levinson, Muslim Brotherhood Looks West in Bid to Revive Egyptian 
Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204062704577220454030969184.html (describing efforts by Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood to avoid discussions of moral issues in favor of more pressing economic 
concerns); David. D. Kirkpatrick, Islamists Head Toward Victory in Tunisia Vote, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 25, 2011, at A1 (indicating preference of Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda to focus on 
economic issues and specifically disclaiming any effort to make morals issues part of the party’s 
political agenda).  
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society’s wealthiest elements to preserve and indeed extend their wealth 
at the expense of the poor. (63, 157)Given this, consigning that approach 
of Islam and law to magnificent works of history such as this one seems 
not such a bad idea. 
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